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down the ordinance as unconstitutional. Different considerations are involved depending on whether a state or federal
statute is before the court. If states have greater scope than
the federal government in barring material as obscene then
the court should remand the case for a further showing by
the city of necessity for such an ordinance. Harlan implies
that he would consider an adequate showing of sufficient
public need justification for upholding the constitutionality
of the ordinance. Even though its effect might be to induce
booksellers to restrict their offerings of non-obscene literary
merchandise for fear of unwittingly having on their shelves
an obscene publication, Harlan feels a state may constitutionally do this to protect its citizens against the dissemination
of obscene material.
The entire field of obscenity regulation involves the drawing of fine lines, the setting of delicate balances, and the laying
of flexible boundaries. A legal line must be drawn between
decency and indeceny. 2 9 A balance must be struck between
the community's need for regulation of obscenity and the
continuance of freedom of expression. And finally the difference in scope between state and federal power to legislate
against it must be determined. All of these factors must be
considered by legislators in devising statutes and the courts in
interpreting them. The role of the Supreme Court is to indicate to these bodies the boundary points of the territory
covered by the First Amendment freedoms, beyond which
they must not trespass in pursuing their respective social
needs. One of those points is defined dearly by the decision
in the instant case.
D. A. B.
29 Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, 531-535 (1941).

DOMESTIC RELATIONS, DIVORCE, RETROACTIVE
MODIFICATION OF ACCRUED ALIMONY
A recent Nebraska decision, Rhuehle v. Rhuehle, serves
as a competent guide in examining the question of the ability
of the courts to retroactively modify accrued installments of
alimony. I This was an action by a wife to recover the amount
I Rhuehle

v. Rhuehle, 169 Neb. 23, 97 N.W. 2d 868 (1959); See Rhuehle v.
Rhuehle, 161 Neb. 691, 74 N.W. 2d 690, (1956).
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owed by her husband for the support of their child under a
divorce decree. However, the defendant had actually paid a
sum in excess of the amount owing under the decree to his
daughter, for her support and maintenance. The plaintiff
claimed in her appeal that the trial court erred in allowing a
credit to the defendant to apply to a child support order,
when the defendant had made payments of cash and had given
gifts of property to the child, none of which was acquiesced
in or requested by the wife. The plaintiff also claimed that
the court erred in not holding, that under a decree granting
a wife a divorce and custody of minor children, monthly
installments of alimony and support become vested as they
accrue, and unpaid past due portions thereof are final judgments and are beyond the power of the court to reduce by
retroactive modification of the original decree.
In deciding for the plaintiff, the court cited Vassung v.
Vassung, in which the same court said:
The general rule is stated in 19 C.J. 359, as follows:
"Payments exacted by the original decree of divorce
become vested in the payee as they accrue, and the
court, on application to modify such decree, is without
authority to reduce the amounts or modify the decree
with reference thereto retrospectively." 2
The problem of retroactive modification of alimony or
support decrees involves a pronounced conflict of authority.
In general, the majority rule is that installments of alimony
become vested when they become due; and in the absence of
fraud the courts are without authority to modify the decree
in regard to installments past due. 3
It has been stated by the courts that the power to cancel or
modify installments of alimony or support which have already
accrued should not be recognized unless a statute allows the
court to do so, unequivocally. This is maintained on the theory
that an award of alimony is final or conclusive as to past due or
accrued installments because there are vested or absolute rights
2

Wassung v. Wassung, 136 Neb. 440, 286 N.W. 340, (1939).

3 27B CJ.S. 190.
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in such installments. 4 Therefore, under the majority rule,
statutes authorizing the alteration and modification of decrees
allowing alimony have no retroactive effect, but their power
extends merely to future installments of alimony. 5
An intermediary rule was established in an Ohio case where
the court held, that unpaid and accrued installments may not be
modified retroactively without a specific reservation of the
power by the court to so do. However, retroactive modification
may be allowed according to the peculiar circumstances of the
case. Accordingly, if strict enforcement of the rule that no
retroactive modification is to be allowed would subsequently
be unduly harsh, unconscionable, and against public policy, the
court has the right to exercise its discretion in order to do
equity. 6
The minority rule as to accrued alimony is that the installments do not vest but are subject to the control of the court.
Thus the court may use its discretion to modify a decree for
past due alimony. 7 They do not take on the characteristics of a
judgment for the payment of a fixed sum until a court of equity
so orders, or until the past due installments are reduced to
judgments. Therefore, following the above, the past due
installments of alimony are subject to the control of the court,
and accordingly the court may modify a decree for alimony or
support as to accrued payments. 8
Upon careful inspection, it becomes apparent that there
are pronounced conflicts of authority on several aspects of
retroactive annulment or modification of past due installments
of alimony. In general, the right of the court to alter provisions of a divorce decree in regard to future payments of
alimony is upheld. However there is a marked conflict of
authority in several states, including apparently conflicting
4 Haller v. Haller, 135 N.E. 2d 224, 10 I. App. 2d 513, (1956); Steele v. Steele, 239

P. 2d 63,108 Ca. 2d 595, (1952).
5 Parker v. Parker, 226 P. 283,203 Ca. 787, (1928).
O Wolfe v. Wolfe, -Ohio-, 124 N.E. 2d 485, (1954).
7

Supra Note 3 at 192.

8 Briggs v. Briggs, 65 N.E. 2d 9, 319 Mass. 149, (1946); Conklin v. Conklin, 27

N.W. 2d 275, 233 Minn. 449, (1947); Karlin v. Karlin, 19 N.E. 2d 669, 280
N. Y. 32, (1939).

1960]

RECENT CASES

decisions in the same jurisdictions, as to the courts' right
to retroactively modify, cancel, or deny the enforcement of
installments of alimony which accrued prior to the filing of
the petition for cancellation. 9
Thus, the rule in some jurisdictions is that installments
of alimony become vested when they become due and the
court has no power to modify the decree as to them. 1 o There is,
however, very respectable authority for the contrary view that
a court has the power to modify decrees as to past due payments. 11
Some states hold that a court has the power to modify
all or part of arrears which have become due under a decree
for alimony or support prior to the filing of a petition to
modify. 12 In other jurisdictions, the courts have held that
they have no such power even though they may modify the
decree with regard to payments which are to come due after
the filing of a petition for modification or after the entry of an
order thereon., 3 Indeed, the majority rule is that the courts
may cancel the arrears of alimony or support which became due
and vested after the filing of a motion for the modificationofthe
decree and prior to the entry of the order based upon such a
request for relief. 1
Where the general power to modify a decree for alimony,
separate maintenance, or support is said to be inherent in the
court and not to depend upon the terms of the statute or
a reservation of power in the original decree, it has been held
that the court also has the inherent right to modify a decree
in arrears.' 5 However, some jurisdictions have held that the
See: 6 A.L.R. 2d 1279.
10 Id. at 1278.
9

11 Id. at 1279.
12 Madden v. Madden, 136 N.J. Eq. 132,40 A. 2d 611, (1945).
13 Stevens v. Stevens, 88 Cal. App. 2d 654, 199 P. 2d 314, (1948); Finnern v.

Brunner, 157 Neb. 281, 92 N.W. 2d 785, (1958).
14 Supra note 8, Briggs v. Briggs.
'5 Winkel v. Winkel, 178 Md. 489,15 A. 2d 914, (1940); Ex ParteJeter, 193 S.C.

278, 8 Se. 2d 490, (1940).
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inherent power to modify a decree does not permit a retroactive modification which will cancel arrears of alimony.16
Where the right to modify a decree for alimony arises from a
reservation of power in the original decree, rather than from a
statute and the reservation does not refer expressly to overdue
payments, it has been held that the court may cancel or reduce
arrears. 17 But in some other states under a similar reservation
in the original decree the contrary conclusion has been
reached. 18
In a few states a statute provides in effect that the court
may modify a decree for alimony, or support and enter any
decree which it might originally have entered. Under such a
statute the majority view is that the court may cancel arrears
of alimony. 19 In many states the only power to amend a
decree for alimony, separate maintenance, or support is derived
from a statute. This is so in the absence of an acceptable reservation of power in the original decree. In these jurisdictions
the right to cancel must be found in the statute, if it is not
reserved in the decree, or it does not exist.2o0
A wide variety of provisions have been held out to permit
the cancellation of arrears. But there are contrary decisions
which are apparent from miscellaneous provisions concerning
the modification of a decree for alimony payments. 21 Statutes
authorizing a court to set aside, alter, cancel, as well as modify
provisions for alimony, separate maintenance, or support,
have been held to permit cancellation of arrears. 2 2
Virginia follows the majority, holding that there is no
modification of accrued alimony installments. 2 3 Although the
16 Id.
17 Id.

18 Plant v. Plant, Mun. Ct. App. D.C., 57 A. 2c 204, (1948).
19 Watts v. Watts, 314 Mass. 129, 49 N.E. 2d 609, (1943).
20 Sistaire v. Sistaire, 218 U. S. 1, 54 L. ed. 905, 30 S.Ct. 682, (1910).
21 Adair v. Superior Court, 44 Ariz. 139, 33 p. 2d 995, (1934).
22 Frost v. Frost, 189 Misc. 133, 71 N. Y.S. 2d 438, (1947).
23 Alfred E. Cohen, Divorce and Alimony in Virginia and West Virginia, Sec. 94d'
(1949).
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Virginia courts are given the right to modify future alimony
payments they are without the power to alter the amount of
alimony which has already accrued. 24 There is no vested property right in alimony that has not accrued, but there is such a
property right in alimony which has already accrued. In direct
correlation therefore, accrued alimony cannot be revised.25
Alimony which has accrued is a vested property right, and may
be dealt with like any other property right. But with respect to
unaccrued alimony, the property right is subject to being
altered and cannot be disposed of as it is not a vested property
right. The consequence of alimony being a property right is
that as a vested property right it cannot be taken away without
a fair compensation and following from the above, accrued
alimony cannot be modified. 26
Even if accrued installments of alimony were not vested
property rights, the authority to modify them would have
to be given in the statutes. And there is no provision in the
statutes of Virginia which empowers the court to modify or
revise matured installments of alimony. 27
In the earlier decisions it appears that it was very fashionable
to state a dear and distinct majority rule and then an equally
dear and distinct minority rule. However, there are now more
pronounced conflicts of authority on several aspects of the
subjects, including conflicting decisions within the same jurisdictions. There seems to be a growing minority which grants
retrospective modification of accrued and vested alimony
payments. The injustices of the court's decision in Rhuehle v.
Rhuehle would be eliminated if that court of equity were
allowed to do equity and thereby modify accrued and vested
alimony installments.
R.B.
24

Cralle v. Cralle, 84 Va. 198, 6 S.E. 12, (1887).

25 Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 10 S.E. 2d 893, (1940).
26

Allen v. Allen, 166 Va. 303, 186 S.E. 17, (1936).

27

6 Michie'sJurisprudence, Divorce and Alimony, Sec. 72.

